Index › shell › findutils findutils 2 tools · 1 release line The GNU file-finding utilities: find and xargs. Every tool here carries the same sandbox boundary. $ kapsl find ⧉ $ kapsl xargs ⧉ Source ↗ Registry ↗ Release lines we maintain · the project decides these findings shown are the whole project at that line Tag Resolves to Lifecycle Updated Findings What the tag promises ▸ latest 4.10.0 stable 2026-08-30 7 tracks the newest supported release stable — floats, carries security updates unstable — tracks pre-releases, may break eol — frozen, upstream is done Tools in this project · pick one to inspect all share one boundary Tool Capabilities Seccomp Findings Image Description ▸ find rw spawn H2M2L3 findutils Search for files in a directory hierarchy ▸ xargs rw spawn H2M2L3 findutils Build and execute command lines from standard input ▸ showing find xargs from findutils@latest → 4.10.0 stable Findings H2M2L3 identical on amd64, arm64 — one table describes both CVE Sev CVSS Affects Description CVE-2026-86145 ↗ H 8.2 pcre2 PCRE2 before 10.48 allows a pcre2_dfa_match out-of-bounds write because reuse of a cached workspace block, in a recursive DFA matching workspace, lacks a size check (even though a newly allocated block, for the same purpose, does have a… CVE-2026-89161 ↗ H 7.4 pcre2 In PCRE2 before 10.48, pcre2_jit_match mishandles a previously copied subject being passed in as a context. An incorrect free operation can occur. CVE-2026-89158 ↗ M 6.5 pcre2 PCRE2 before 10.48, on 32-bit platforms, has a pcre2_compile_32 integer overflow and resultant out-of-bounds write. CVE-2026-89157 ↗ M 5.7 pcre2 PCRE2 before 10.48, on 32-bit platforms, has a pcre2_pattern_convert out-of-bounds write when an attacker can provide a large pattern. CVE-2026-89160 ↗ L 3.7 pcre2 PCRE2 before 10.48 has a pcre2_match out-of-bounds read during the PCRE2_MATCH_INVALID_UTF matching of an invalid UTF subject. CVE-2026-89156 ↗ L 2.9 pcre2 PCRE2 before 10.48 has a pcre2_match out-of-bounds read after a JIT fallback when an attacker can provide invalid UTF data. CVE-2026-89162 ↗ L 2.9 pcre2 In PCRE2 before 10.48, pcre2_serialize_encode might disclose two bytes to an adversary, typically in a situation where the access available to the adversary is already unsafe. These are the findings of findutils, which ships every tool in this project. kapsl reports and gates; it never edits an image to clear a finding. Composition default nothing — stands alone runtime none — self-contained composes not used as a runtime Some tools are only useful composed: a pip-installed CLI needs python as its runtime, bash pulls in coreutils. kapsl resolves that for you — -e git,python:flake8 composes explicitly. Composition default + echo runtime none — self-contained composes echo Some tools are only useful composed: a pip-installed CLI needs python as its runtime, bash pulls in coreutils. kapsl resolves that for you — -e git,python:flake8 composes explicitly. Image name findutils platforms amd64 sha256:5521…ed75 copy arm64 sha256:7faa…1b56 copy size 1 MB unpacked · 1 layer base scratch signed cosign · 2026-08-30 · public key findings last changed 2026-09-16 Sandbox boundary find capabilities rw Filled is granted to every invocation; the rest need --cap at the point of use. seccomp tier per tool spawn The syscall filter applied to this tool's entry point. Tools sharing an image do not share a tier. host paths mounted in read-only unless noted none env passed through none none Nothing else crosses in. No AWS_*, no SSH_AUTH_SOCK unless you ask. env set by kapsl none none per-subcommand no overrides Every invocation gets the same boundary. Where a tool needs more for one subcommand only, kapsl scopes it there rather than granting it everywhere. Sandbox boundary xargs capabilities rw Filled is granted to every invocation; the rest need --cap at the point of use. seccomp tier per tool spawn The syscall filter applied to this tool's entry point. Tools sharing an image do not share a tier. host paths mounted in read-only unless noted none env passed through none none Nothing else crosses in. No AWS_*, no SSH_AUTH_SOCK unless you ask. env set by kapsl none none per-subcommand no overrides Every invocation gets the same boundary. Where a tool needs more for one subcommand only, kapsl scopes it there rather than granting it everywhere. Provenance sbom amd64 ↗ arm64 ↗ attestation amd64 ↗ arm64 ↗ scan report amd64 ↗ arm64 ↗ vex amd64 ↗ arm64 ↗ Every image ships a full SBOM and a signed build attestation. Nothing here is a claim you have to take on trust. 7 findings across this project at latest. Counted once per advisory across every image the project builds.